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1. INTRODUCTION 
RECENT years have seen profound and wide-ranging changes to the nature 
and structure of the European Union (EU). The signing of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty has paved the way for European nations to realise 
the approaching of the ambitious aim of the Maastricht Treaty, that is to 
create an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’, based on the 
values and principles shared by all Member States. This has been achieved 
through the identification of the Union as the incarnation of democratic 
values and principles which are respected worldwide. Throughout the 
history of European integration, the notion “acquis communautaire” has 
remained one of the least-well defined, and one of the most-frequently 
applied. Having been conceived as a concept linked to the EU legal order, 
the acquis communautaire has quickly become associated with the wider 
domains of EU policies. In particular, the EU has actively used the “acquis 
communautaire” to strengthen the integrity of its internal legal and 
political order and to serve its far-reaching external policy ambitions. 
Our article focuses on two major objectives. The first is to shed some 
light on the dynamic character of the acquis communautaire. The second 
is to study the phenomenon of the acquis communautaire as an instrument 
of the EU external policy. In the first part of the article we shall argue that 
the acquis communautaire mirrors the dynamic character of the EU legal 
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order. It is a constantly evolving concept, which encroached into legal, 
political, social, and historical domains. In the second part of the article we 
shall endeavour to clarify how the dynamic character of the acquis 
communautaire influences the acquis communautaire within internal and 
external dimensions of its application. In this respect we shall advocate the 
view that the acquis communautaire changes its scope in line with 
objectives of its application. This notion has particular significance for the 
external dimension of the acquis communautaire’s application. It could 
mean that the acquis communautaire is “exported” into legal systems of 
third countries in line with objectives of EU external agreements and level 
of political and economic cooperation between the EU and a third country. 
In the third part of the article we provide the case study on the Ukrainian 
experience of approximation of national legislation to EU law. In our 
opinion, this case study displays many supporting arguments in favour of 
our theoretical findings. This case study indicates that the approximation 
of Ukrainian laws to those of the EU always took place in line with 
objectives of the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA)1 and the general political environment between the EU and 
Ukraine. We conclude this article with the statement that the dynamic 
nature and ambiguity of the acquis communautaire made it one of the 
most effective means to “export” the EU’s fundamental values and 
principles into the political and legal systems of third countries. Since the 
unprecedented EU enlargement at the end of the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 
centuries, the need to adopt the acquis communautaire is being considered 
as an essential pre-requisite for maintaining and enhancing good political 
and economic relations between the EU and third countries. 
2. THE “ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE”  
IS AN AMBIGUOUS AND DYNAMIC CONCEPT IN THE EU LEGAL ORDER 
2.1. Hitherto, the acquis communautaire remains one of the most 
ambiguous concepts in EU legal order. Neither EU founding treaties nor 
EU secondary legislation and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case 
law provide any clear definition of the acquis communautaire, while 
frequently referring to this concept. For instance, Article 2(4) of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) recognises the acquis communautaire as one of 
the objectives of the newly-founded EU: 
 
                                                          
1 O.J. 1998, L 49, entered into force 1st March 1998. 
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‘to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it 
[emphasis added] with a view to considering to what extent the 
policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need 
to be revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms and institutions of the Community’. 
 
Article 3(1) TEU endorsed the importance of the acquis communautaire 
as a foundation of the EU and of the whole institutional system. 
 
‘The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which 
shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried 
out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building on 
the acquis communautaire [emphasis added]’. 
 
Provisions of the TEU on the enhanced cooperation between the 
Member States, in particular, Article 43(1)(e) TEU provided that it ‘does 
not affect the “acquis communautaire” and the measures adopted under the 
other provisions of the [founding] Treaties’. 
Further references to the acquis communautaire are found in Protocol № 
7 of the application of the principles of subsidiary and proportionality 
annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA)2, and in Declaration № 51 concerning 
Article 10 TEU accompanying the ToA3. Moreover, the acquis 
communautaire is mentioned in the Preambles to the “Protocol of the 
Twelve” and “the Agreement of the Eleven” which form the integral part of 
the EC Treaty. 
 
‘without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty, particularly those 
relating to social policy which constitute an integral part of the acquis 
communautaire … [the High Contracting Parties] state their wish … 
                                                          
2 Provision 2 related to the acquis communautaire reads: ‘The application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality shall respect the general provisions 
and the objectives of the Treaty, particularly as regards the maintaining in full of 
the acquis communautaire and the institutional balance…’. 
3 Provision related to the acquis communautaire reads as follows: ‘The Treaty of 
Amsterdam repeals and deletes lapsed provisions of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community… they were in force before the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam and adapts certain of their provisions… Those operations do 
not affect the ‘acquis communautaire’’. 
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to implement the 1989 Social Charter on the basis of the acquis 
communautaire4’. 
 
At the same time, Protocol № 2 ToA refers to all agreements and related 
provisions listed in the Annex to this Protocol as the “Schengen acquis”, 
thereby locating the acquis communautaire within a specific area/sector of 
EU legislation. 
The EU institutions are inclined to emphasise the legal nature of the 
acquis communautaire. For instance, the EU’s Glossary plainly considers 
the acquis communautaire ‘the body of common rights and obligations 
which bind all the Member States together within the European Union’5. 
The 2002 Strategy on Accession equates the acquis communautaire with 
EU legislation6. The same approach is undertaken in the EU Constitutional 
Treaty, which indirectly associates the acquis communautaire with the 
EC/EU legal order7. 
                                                          
4 Treaty establishing the European Community (O.J. 2002 C 325). 
5 As the EU’s Glossary of definitions provides: ‘The Community acquis is the 
body of common rights and obligations which bind all the Member States together 
within the European Union. It is constantly evolving and comprises: the content, 
principles and political objectives of the Treaties; the legislation adopted in 
application of the treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; the declarations 
and resolutions adopted by the Union; measures relating to the common foreign 
and security policy; measures relating to justice and home affairs; international 
agreements concluded by the Community and those concluded by the Member 
States between themselves in the field of the Union’s activities. Thus the 
Community acquis comprises not only Community law in the strict sense, but also 
all acts adopted under the second and third pillars of the European Union and the 
common objectives laid down in the Treaties. The Union has committed itself to 
maintaining the Community acquis in its entirety and developing it further. 
Applicant countries have to accept the Community acquis before they can join the 
Union. Derogations from the acquis are granted only in exceptional circumstances 
and are limited in scope. To integrate into the European Union, applicant countries 
will have to transpose the acquis into their national legislation and implement it 
from the moment of their accession’. EU Glossary 
<http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/community_acquis_en.htm>, last visited  30 
October 2006. 
6 “Towards the Enlarged Union” Strategy Paper and Report of the European 
Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate countries 
(COM (2002) 700 final, at 1.4). 
7 Article IV-438 (3-4) of the EU Constitutional Treaty. The EU Constitutional 
Treaty endeavours to provide more or less coherent clarification of the scope of the 
acquis communautaire. The EU Constitutional Treaty’s provisions on succession 
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However, the narrow understanding of the acquis communautaire as a 
mere legal concept has been repeatedly challenged by academics. It is 
almost universally agreed that the acquis communautaire is not equivalent 
to the EU legal order, but constitutes a much broader concept with clear 
political emphasis, which has stretched the boundaries of a mere legal 
concept, and has been used in other contexts, including the political, 
social, and historical. This view has been shared by many experts in 
European studies. Gialdino8, Weatherill9, Delcourt10 and Azoulai11 have 
emphasised the dynamic nature of the acquis communautaire within its 
legal context. Krenzler and Everson12 have argued for an even broader 
understanding of the acquis communautaire as a legal framework, 
embracing real and potential rights within the EU system. Wiener13 has 
                                                          
and legal continuity specify elements of the acquis communautaire to be 
transposed into one pillar of EU legal order. These elements encompass the 
following: EU founding treaties; acts of institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; 
interinstitutional agreements, decisions and agreements arrived at by the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States; the agreements 
concluded by the Member States on the functioning of the EC/EU or linked to 
action by the EC/EU: the declarations, including those made in the context of 
intergovernmental conferences, as well as the resolutions or other positions 
adopted by the European Council or the Council and those relating to the EC/EU 
adopted by common accord by the Member States. The ECJ/CFI case law shall 
remain the source of interpretation of EU law and of the comparable provisions of 
the EU Constitutional Treaty. There is no reference to other elements of the acquis 
communautaire apart from EC/EU legal acts. Therefore, the EU Constitutional 
Treaty regards the acquis communautaire as a normative concept that encompasses 
binding and non-binding EU legal acts. 
8 C. GIALDINO, Some reflections on the acquis communautaire, 32 CMLRev. 
1089-1121 (1995). 
9 S. WEATHERILL, Safequarding the Acquis Communautaire, in: T. HEUKELS / N. 
BLOKKER / M. BRUS (eds), The European Union after Amsterdam, (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague / London / Boston, 1998) 153-178, 161-162. 
10 C. DELCOURT, The Acquis Communautaire: Has the Concept Had Its Day?, 38 
CMLRev. 829-870 (2001). 
11 L. AUZOLAI, The Acquis of the European Union and International 
Organisations, 11(2) ELJ 196-231 (2005). 
12 H. G. KRENZLER / M. EVERSON, Preparing for the acquis communautaire. 
Report of the Working Group on the Eastward Enlargement of the European 
Union, October 1998 (European University Institute, RSC Policy Paper № 98/6). 
<http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/98_06p.htm>, last visited 30 October 2006. 
13 A. WIENER, The Embedded Acquis Communautaire: Transmission Belt and 
Prism of New Governance, 3 ELJ 294-315 (1998). 
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gone further and advocated the theory of the “embedded acquis” which 
covers practices, policy objectives and informal ideas and values. The 
Dutch legal scholar Mortelmans14 has depicted the acquis communautaire 
as ‘a political or policy concept’, and has clearly distinguished it from the 
basic tenets of EU law.  
 
2.2. In our opinion, the ambiguity of the acquis communautaire is 
justified by the dynamic, or sui generis, nature of the EU legal order. In 
this respect, the dynamism of the EU legal order entails its never-ending 
evolution, under the pressure of various internal and external factors, such 
as the need for closer economic development inside the EU, and the 
enhancement of security and political stability along EU borders. The 
dynamism of the EU legal order is based on acquired common rules, 
practices and values, which are embraced by the complex notion “acquis 
communautaire”. In other words, the acquis communautaire ensures the 
continuity of the EU legal order through the fact that it encompasses 
everything that has been achieved within the EU, even beyond legal 
practices. In general, the acquis communautaire may be seen as the result 
of the application of various tools/instruments/powers which the EU 
possesses both internally and externally. Commentators have correctly 
compared the dynamic nature of the EU legal order to a living organism15. 
In our opinion, the acquis communautaire may be associated with the 
memory, education and genes of this living organism. If, in a similar vein 
to Kipling’s Mowgli, the EU were to lose its heritage - the acquis 
communautaire - one could hardly predict how it would survive the 
pressures of the jungle of the international community. 
 
2.3. The dynamic nature of the “acquis communautaire” has proved to be 
a particularly useful concept in the course of EU external action. The 
notion “acquis communautaire” has gradually become one of the most 
significant tools underpinning EU’s tailor-made actions towards third 
countries, ranging from accession to partnership and cooperation 
initiatives. At the same time, the ambiguity of this notion has resulted in 
its gradual transformation into a universal category, which has no fixed 
context and scope, but which must be comprehended exclusively within 
the particular circumstances of EU external action towards third countries. 
For example, in the context of accession, the adoption of the acquis 
                                                          
14 K. MORTELMANS, Community Law: More than a Functional Area of Law, 
Less than a Legal System, 1 LIEI 23-48 (1996). 
15 Supra note 11, at 196. 
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communautaire by candidate countries means the implementation of the 
whole EU legal heritage including EU sectoral acquis, EU general 
principles and the ECJ rulings. In the context of the EU policy of 
partnership and cooperation with third countries, the acquis 
communautaire has a narrower scope, and embraces mainly sectoral EU 
legislation within priority areas of cooperation, like competition law, 
protection of intellectual property rights, and state aids. Hitherto, the 
acquis communautaire remains at the top of the EU agenda for external 
action. The newly-launched European Neighbourhood Policy encourages 
neighbouring states to adhere to the EU “common values”, and to adopt the 
vast scope of the acquis communautaire in order to achieve mutual access 
to markets of goods, services and capital16. 
 
2.4. In conclusion we state that ambiguity of the acquis communautaire 
is justified by the dynamism of the entire EU legal order. The acquis 
communautaire became a very useful concept which reflects the never-
ending evolution of the EU. Consequently, the EU is keen to maintain the 
ambiguity of the acquis communautaire in relations with third countries 
with purpose to ensure the far-reaching export of own principles and 
values into legal orders of third countries. 
3. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS  
OF THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE 
3.1. It is suggested that  internal and external dimensions of the acquis 
communautaire are not identical and may vary in line with specific 
objectives of the acquis communautaire’s application. That is to say, the 
objective of the acquis communautaire in its internal dimension is to 
ensure the consistent development of the EU while preserving European 
Communities (EC)/EU patrimony through adherence of the Member States 
to the “fundamental acquis” (obligations enshrined in the EU founding 
treaties), EU general principles, international law acquis, applicable to the 
EU Member States, and “soft law” acquis. Conversely, the objective of the 
acquis communautaire in its external dimension is to push candidate 
countries to the forefront of the acquired level of economic, political and 
                                                          
16 Communication from the Commission “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A 
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (COM 
(2003) 104 final). Communication from the European Commission “European 
Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” COM (2004) 373 final. 
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legal cooperation within the EU. In other words, it is to export as much as 
possible of the acquis communautaire, which is sometime not yet binding 
towards the EU Member States, with purpose to prepare candidate 
countries for democratic standards and competitive economy pressures 
within the EU. 
 
3.2. If we look at the acquis communautaire in the EU external 
agreements we can find additional support for our argumentation that the 
external dimension of the acquis communautaire does not coincide with 
the internal dimension of the acquis communautaire. Two points are worth 
of attention here. Firstly, none of the EU external agreements replicates 
the far-reaching objectives of the EU founding treaties. Thus the acquis 
communautaire in an EU external agreement should be applied in 
accordance with the objectives of these agreements. For instance, the “pre-
signature” acquis communautaire within the European Economic Area 
(EEA) Agreement must be applied and implemented in accordance with 
the EAA Agreement objectives, which are different to the objectives of the 
EU founding treaties17. Secondly, the acquis communautaire within the 
EU external agreement must be perceived as having a different legal 
nature from the acquis communautaire. It is because the acquis 
communautaire departs from the supranational nature of the acquis 
communautaire. It may be enforced only via national constitutional 
procedures as part of the international law applicable in that country. As a 
result, constitutional courts in third countries can exercise broad discretion 
in interpreting the relevant acquis within their legal orders. Even in the 
EEA Agreement, where the export of the relevant acquis is equipped by a 
sophisticated homogeneity procedure, it is left to the discretion of national 
courts of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Member States to 
implement in a homogeneous fashion certain elements of the “post-
signature” EC “relevant acquis”. This is because the homogeneity formula 
relies on the unpredicted political will of the EFTA Member States for the 
voluntary adaptation of the dynamic acquis communautaire into their legal 
orders. Furthermore, the objectives of EU external agreements and the 
latest trends of EU external policy towards certain third countries may 
                                                          
17 O.J. 1994, L 1/3. Introduction to Annex XIV of the EEA Agreement warns 
that ‘preambles, the addresses of the EC acts; references to territories or languages 
of the EC; references to rights and obligations of EC Member States, their public 
entities, undertakings and individuals in relation to each other; and references to 
information and notification procedures are specific to the EC legal order’ and 
therefore cannot be identically applied to the EFTA Member States. 
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influence the interpretation of third countries constitutional courts’ 
regarding the relevant acquis within their national constitutional orders, as 
witnessed in the Sveinbjörnsdottir case18 judged by the EFTA Court, and 
in the Scoda Auto case judged by the Czech Constitutional Court19. 
 
3.3. Furthermore, we argue that the external dimension of the 
application of the acquis communautaire does not entail its identical scope 
towards third countries, which signed agreements with the EU. For 
instance, the acquis communautaire to be adopted by candidate countries 
is not similar to the relevant acquis within specific EU external agreement 
with third countries. In our opinion it is justified by different objectives of 
the acquis communautaire application. The former is aimed at preparing a 
candidate country for membership in the EU, while the latter is targeted 
merely at maintaining partnership relations between the parties. 
Consequently, we suggest that the scope of the acquis communautaire in 
its external dimension is not uniform, but varies from one agreement to 
another in accordance with specific objectives of EU external agreements. 
In order to test our theory we endeavour to consider if the scope of the 
acquis communautaire changes in line with objectives of EU external 
agreements. We can highlight two types of the acquis, which are most 
frequently applied within EU external agreements. The first type of the 
acquis encompasses vague legal categories such as “essential elements”, 
“common/shared values”, principles of international public law and 
international trade law, the principle of non-discrimination, and European 
standards. None of these elements is precisely defined in EU external 
agreements, thereby providing a wide scope for interpretation by either 
Party. Nevertheless, these elements are considered important for the 
construction of a common legal environment between the Parties in the 
course of the enhancement of mutual relations. For instance, the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) emphasises the significance of the 
“common/shared values” concept for the eventual upgrade of bilateral 
                                                          
18 The EFTA Court in Sveinbjörnsdottir case characterised the EEA Agreement 
as ‘an international treaty sui generis which contains a distinctive legal order of its 
own’ (Case E-9/97, Erla Maria Sveinbjörnsdottir v. the Government of Iceland. 
Advisory Opinion of the EFTA Court of 10 December 1998, Report of the EFTA 
Court, at 97). 
19 Scoda Auto, Collection of decisions of the Czech Constitutional Court, vol. 8, 
p. 149. 
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relations with each neighbour state20. The EU Constitutional Treaty partly 
rectifies this puzzle by providing a set of the “Union’s values” and 
principles applicable to both internal and external EU policies. However, 
the specific legal meaning of the “Union’s values” remains far from clear. 
We expect that even if the EU Constitutional Treaty eventually comes into 
force, EU institutions will retain the “final word” in identifying the scope 
of the “Union’s values” applicable within EU external policy. 
The second type comprises the “relevant” acquis, which usually means 
the EU sectoral legislation like competition law, customs, intellectual 
property, technical and food standards, which is enshrined in the text of an 
agreement and/or in annexes of an EU external agreement. In general, 
third countries are bound to adopt the “relevant” acquis in order to achieve 
specific objectives of agreements with the EU, like the access to the EU 
internal market freedoms (EEA Agreement), establishment of the customs 
union with the EU (EC-Turkey association)21, setting up an enhanced 
sectoral cooperation with the EU (EU-Switzerland Sectoral Agreements)22. 
Both types of the acquis communautaire, which are described above are 
not static concepts but dynamic legal categories which change their scope 
in accordance with the specific objectives of the EU external agreement. 
That is to say that the “relevant acquis” within the EC-Switzerland Sectoral 
Agreements (SAs) differs from the “relevant acquis” within the EC-
Mexico Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA)23. This 
is because the EC-Switzerland SAs provide for the implementation of a 
sectoral acquis communautaire into the Swiss legal system, while the EC-
Mexico TDCA establishes a free trade area between the EC and Mexico 
on the basis of the relevant World Trade Organisation (WTO) acquis. 
Furthermore, EU external agreements tend to reflect the evolution of the 
acquis communautaire within specific sectors of EC competence. For 
                                                          
20 Сommunication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (COM (2003) 104 final). 
21 O.J. 1973 C 113/2. 
22 1) the Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation (O.J. 2002, L 
114/468); 2) the Agreement on Specific Aspects of Government Procurement (O.J. 
2002, L 114/430); 3) the Agreement on Mutual Recognition in relation to 
Conformity Assessment (O.J. 2002, L 114/369); 4) the Agreement on Trade in 
Agricultural Products (O.J. 2002, L 114/132); 5) the Agreement on Air Transport 
(O.J. 2002, L 114/73); 6) the Agreement on the Carriage of Goods and Passengers 
by Rail and Road (O.J. 2002, L 114/91); 7) the Agreement on the Free Movement 
of Persons (O.J. 2002, L 114/6). 
23 O.J. 2000 L 276. 
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instance, the latest generation of association agreements with Western 
Balkan countries (Stabilisation and Association Agreements - SAAs)24 
refers to the newly-occupied sectors of the acquis communautaire (audio-
visual aspects, cross-border broadcasting, acquisition of intellectual 
property rights for programmes and broadcasts by satellite or cable, and 
cooperation in electronic communications and associated services). 
 
3.4. In our opinion, the objectives of EU external agreements imply a 
hierarchy of acquis communautaire elements which are to be exported into 
a third country’s legal system. On the one hand, the aspiration of eventual 
full EU membership requires a third country to adopt not only the relevant 
acquis communautaire listed in the annexes to the agreement (EEA 
Agreement, SAAs)25, but also to embark upon the challenging process of 
voluntary approximation of her national legislation to that of the EU. On 
the other hand, the objective of a closer political dialogue between the EU 
and a third country means that this third country must prioritise its strict 
adherence to “essential elements” clauses (PCAs, TDCAs, the Cotonou 
Agreement26), and to the sectoral acquis communautaire (usually related to 
the mutual liberalisation of trade), over other elements of the acquis. The 
aim of liberalising the economic relations between the EC and a third 
country presumes the application of WTO rules and standards, regardless 
of formal WTO membership (PCAs, the Cotonou Agreement). Logically, 
the aim of establishing the EC-Turkey customs union requires Turkey to 
adopt the EC customs acquis in full. 
 
3.5. Furthermore, it is important to highlight explicit links between the 
scope of the acquis communautaire to be imposed on a third country and 
factors such as EU external policy towards third countries and EU 
recognition of their legal systems. For instance, associate agreements with 
EFTA countries and with Switzerland contain neither essential elements 
clauses, nor any reference to the human rights or the fundamental 
                                                          
24 At the moment of writing the SAAs have been concluded with the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (COM (2001) 90 final) and Croatia 
(COM (2001) 371 final). The FYROM and Croatia SAAs entered into force on 3rd 
May 2001 and on 12th December 2001 respectively. 
25 The scope of the “pre-signature” acquis communautaire is not limited by EC 
acts directly referred to in the SAs and Annexes, but it does encompass any of the 
EU-Swiss SAs provisions that is either equivalent to or resembles the relevant 
acquis communautaire. 
26 O.J. 2000 L317/3. 
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freedoms acquis. In the case of Switzerland, the absence of these essential 
elements may be explained by the absence of a framework agreement 
between the EU and Switzerland. In the case of the EEA Agreement, this 
may be explained by an insufficient attitude on behalf of the EC towards 
human rights and commitments to fundamental freedoms in the EU 
external agreements at the time of signing. The EEA Agreement may have 
been conceived purely as an economic framework agreement aimed at 
bringing the EFTA countries closer to the EC internal market. The EC-
Israeli Euro Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA)27 displays 
considerable recognition by the EU for the Israeli legal system, far beyond 
other EMAAs28. For example, the approximation clause in the EC-Israel 
association agreement envisages the possibility of the mutual convergence 
of the Parties’ legislation, while other EMAAs provide direct and indirect 
means for the acquis communautaire to be exported into the legal systems 
of Mediterranean countries. 
 
3.6. To sum up, we state that the export of the acquis communautaire 
takes place in an individual, tailor-made manner, taking into account 
various political, economic and legal aspects of EU external policy 
towards third countries. In some cases, the EU is ready to compromise the 
integrity of the acquis communautaire by allowing third countries to 
implement the relevant sectoral acquis in a “piece-by-piece” approach. For 
example, owing to a tough negotiation strategy, Switzerland was allowed 
to derogate from some mandatory elements of the Schengen acquis. In 
other cases, the EU strengthens its pressure on third countries to adopt the 
whole acquis communautaire, which in turn promulgates their will to 
upgrade the format of bilateral relations with the EU. For instance, the 
latest SAAs stipulate the adoption of the so-called “pre-negotiation” acquis 
by the Western Balkan countries. It brings us to the conclusion that the 
concept of “acquis” in EU external agreements exceeds the boundaries of a 
legal concept. The acquis communautaire must be considered as a 
dynamic concept and as a sophisticated tool of EU external policy towards 
third countries, since the acquis communautaire changes its scope and 
meaning in line with objectives of EU external agreements and level of 
political and economic relations between the EU and third countries. 
                                                          
27 O.J. 2000 L 147/1. 
28 The EMAAs have been concluded between the EC and Algeria, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the 
Palestinian Authority. 
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4. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL MEANS  
OF THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE EXPORT  
INTO LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THIRD COUNTRIES 
4.1. In this part of the article we test our theory through the scrutiny of 
substantive and procedural means to export the acquis into the legal 
systems of third countries. In other words, we analyse whether the 
objectives of EU external agreements have an effect on the substantive and 
procedural means of export. The former refer to the fundamental ways of 
implementing the acquis communautaire into third-country legal orders. 
They are: 1) the export of the fixed acquis communautaire into legal 
systems of third countries through annexes and direct references to the EU 
acquis in EU external agreements; 2) homogeneity; 3) binding and soft 
harmonisation commitments in EU external agreements; 4) approximation 
clauses in EU external agreements; 5) mutual recognition agreements. The 
latter relate to specific technical/procedural tools which either directly or 
indirectly encourage the implementation of the acquis communautaire into 
third-country legal orders. The following tools are inherent to procedural 
means of the acquis communautaire export into legal systems of third 
countries: 1) formal and informal involvement of third countries in the EC 
decision-making process; 2) exchange of information between the EU 
institutions and third countries’ institutions; 3) technical, administrative 
and financial assistance to third countries. 
 
4.2. The very important issue to consider: does the EU apply substantive 
and procedural means to export the acquis communautaire in line with the 
objectives of the EU external agreements? We argue that the substantive 
and procedural means of exporting the acquis communautaire are not 
uniformly applicable, but are rather exercised in accordance with the 
specific objectives of EU external agreements. Indeed, objectives of the 
EU agreements unquestionably constitute a driving force behind 
understanding the role and mechanism of the substantive and procedural 
means of exporting the acquis. Among all these, homogeneity, which is 
enshrined in the EEA, remains the most advanced tool for exporting the 
acquis communautaire. Nevertheless, the most recent EU external 
agreements do not replicate the entire homogeneity procedure found in 
earlier agreements. Instead, they apply selected elements of the 
homogeneity procedure in order to achieve the specific objectives of the 
EU external agreements. On the one hand, objectives to bring about closer 
economic and political cooperation (customs union, free trade area, mutual 
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recognition regime) imply that third countries will accept binding 
substantive and procedural means to implement the acquis communautaire 
into their own legal system. On the other hand, the objectives of EC 
partnership, cooperation and development agreements envisage less 
ambitious substantive and procedural means (non-binding 
harmonisation/approximation of laws commitments, supported by 
technical and educational assistance on behalf of the EU; they also do not 
envisage the involvement of a third country in EC decision-making 
procedures). In the former case, the EU expects candidate countries to 
export the fixed and dynamic acquis communautaire as widely and as 
soon as possible, whereas the latter EU external agreements encourage 
third countries to embark upon a process of voluntary harmonisation 
through the gradual adoption of the relevant acquis29. 
 
4.3. We believe that the level of institutional integration between the EU 
and third countries reflects the objectives of EU external agreements. In 
particular, the composition and competence of common institutions are set 
up in such a way as to suit the objectives of the EU external agreements. 
This means that the EU external agreements which pursue closer economic 
and political cooperation with third countries (EAs, SAAs, PCAs) institute 
the Councils, Committees, and Parliamentary Committees. On the other 
hand, external agreements which do not contain any far-reaching 
integration objectives usually establish a simple one-pillar institutional 
framework (Joint Committees). Common institutions within EU external 
agreements significantly contribute to the implementation of the EU 
constitutional and institutional values, such as transparency and 
accountability, democracy and judicial control. 
 
4.4. Another observation is that the substantive and procedural means to 
export the acquis communautaire are supported by strong conditionality 
requirements on behalf of the EU. The further enhancement of bilateral 
relations between the EU and a third country, in particular the opening of 
negotiations on a mutual recognition regime, depends on the success of 
approximation efforts. Therefore, EU external agreements contain 
conditionality provisions such as: ‘account shall be taken of the progress 
                                                          
29 A. EVANS, The Integration of the European Community and Third States in 
Europe: a Legal Analysis, (Clarendon Press Oxford 1996), 381-383. In general A. 
Evans is critical regarding the nature of voluntary harmonisation within the EAs. 
In his opinion, voluntary harmonisation is ill-adapted to structural economic 
problems faced by these countries. 
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achieved by the Parties in the approximation of their laws’,30 or ‘the 
Community shall examine periodically whether [a party to an agreement] 
has indeed introduced such legislation [in the public utilities sector]’31. 
 
4.5. These observations highlight our initial suggestion that the EU 
considers the export of the acquis communautaire an intrinsic part of its 
foreign policy towards third countries. Indeed, the substantive and 
procedural means of exporting the acquis communautaire into EU external 
agreements inspire third countries to adopt as much as possible of the 
dynamic acquis in order to create a comparable and friendly legal 
environment beyond existing and potential EU boundaries. 
5. CASE STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF THE EU-UKRAINE PCA OBJECTIVES, 
AND THE STATUS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS,  
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UKRAINIAN APPROXIMATION 
PROGRAMME AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM 
5.1. Throughout this article we argued that the scope of the acquis 
communautaire reflects the objectives of EU external agreements, as well 
as the status of EU policy towards a third country. At this stage, we want 
to test our findings through a case study. The question of our case study is 
“how” the objectives of the EU-Ukraine PCA and the status of bilateral 
EU-Ukraine relations influence the Ukrainian approximation of laws 
programme. We believe that the example of Ukraine will provide strong 
evidence that supports our theory and, consequently, will help us answer 
the question of this case study. EU policy toward Ukraine has experienced 
several important modifications over the last decades which, in our 
opinion, have directly and indirectly influenced the character of the whole 
approximation of laws process.  
 
5.2. EU policy towards Ukraine has not been consistent. It changed 
several times over the last decade. Our case study concerns four stages of 
EU-Ukraine relations. The first stage lasted from 1994 to 1998. It started 
with the signing of the PCA by the EU and Ukraine on 16
th
 June 1994, and 
ended with its entry into force on 1
st
 March 1998. The Ukrainian 
Parliament - the Verkhovna Rada - promptly ratified the PCA on 10
th
 
                                                          
30 Article 56(3) Croatia SAA. 
31 Article 72 Croatia and FYROM SAAs. 
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November 199432. However, the EU was reluctant to speed up the PCA’s 
entry into force. This could be explained by serious economic and political 
constraints within the EU towards the whole set of PCA agreements. The 
former relate to the over-protectionist economic policies employed by 
Newly Independent States (NIS) countries, which led to severe trade 
disputes with the EU33. The latter concern the enhancement of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) structures and the dominant 
role of the Russian Federation throughout the entire post-Soviet area. In 
our opinion, the EU used the policy of conditionality with regard to the 
PCAs’ entering into force. This means that the EU used all political and 
economic means to encourage NIS countries to pursue internal market 
reforms, and to counterbalance Russian dominance before the PCA 
formally entered into force. Ukraine was the first country to respond to 
this strategy. The change of domestic political elites took place in 1996 in 
Ukraine. This was caused by economic crisis, hyperinflation and 
disintegration within the entire post Soviet area. In 1996, the first 
Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk (one of the initiators of the USSR’s 
abolishment in 1991) lost his campaign for re-election to Leonid Kuchma. 
Kravchuk’s successor quickly realised that the recovery of the Ukrainian 
political and economic strength could be accelerated by a change of 
foreign policy towards Europe. Consequently, President Kuchma 
gradually reduced the participation of Ukraine in CIS structures, in order 
to enable a possible rapprochement with the EU, with the perspective of 
eventual membership. In our opinion, these changes accelerated the formal 
entry into force of the EU-Ukraine PCA on behalf of the EU on 1
st
 March 
199834. In fact, this was the second agreement, after the Russian PCA, to 
enter into force35. 
The second stage of EU-Ukraine relations lasted from the date of the 
PCA ratification to the issue by the European Council of the Common 
Strategy on Ukraine on 11
th
 December 1999. From 1
st
 March 1998 to the 
present day, the PCA has remained the major legal document governing 
                                                          
32 Law issued by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On ratification of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States and Ukraine”, № 237/94-ВР. 
33 For example, see on the ‘Daewoo’ trade dispute between the EU and Ukraine, 
C. HILLION, Trade dispute overshadows entry into force of EC agreement, 6 EU 
Focus (1998). 
34 Council and Commission Decision of 26th January 1998 on the conclusion of 
the PCA between the EC and their Member States and Ukraine (O.J. 1998 L49). 
35 EC-Russia PCA (OJ 1997 L 327), entered in force 1st December 1997. 
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EU-Ukraine relations36. In general, the EU-Ukraine PCA objectives focus 
on the establishment of a political dialogue; the facilitation of economic 
relations between the EU and Ukraine; the promotion of democratic 
reforms in Ukraine; human rights protection and the establishment of a 
legal order that guarantees the rule of law. The Preamble of the Agreement 
intentionally omits any reference to ‘the process of European integration’ 
or ‘the objective of membership in the EU’, as these were provided in the 
EU association agreements with countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
known as “Europe Agreements” (EA)37. Therefore, the EU-Ukraine PCA 
does not pursue far-reaching objectives of either close economic 
cooperation between the Parties, or full EU membership. Instead, it is 
aimed solely at the development of close political relations; the promotion 
of trade, investment and harmonious economic relations between the 
Parties; the sustaining mutually advantageous cooperation and the support 
of Ukrainian efforts to complete its transition into a market economy38. 
Thus, the EU-Ukraine PCA, as well as other PCAs, could be seen as a 
quite successful formula in EU external policy. For the time being, it 
certainly serves its purpose as a reliable legal instrument in sustaining 
long-term relations with NIS countries, while holding them at a safe 
distance from closer access to the EC Single Market39. The scope of EU 
legislation put forward as a pattern of approximation for Ukraine mirrors 
the narrow objectives of the EU-Ukraine PCA. It comprises “priority 
areas” defined in Article 51 PCA40. The “approximation clause” in Article 
51 of the PCA imposes a soft law obligation on Ukraine merely to 
‘endeavor to ensure’ the compatibility of its legislation to EC laws. 
With the entering into force of the PCA in 1998, the Ukrainian 
government decided to push for a deeper level of cooperation with the EU. 
                                                          
36 Similar PCAs were signed with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus (it has not 
come into force), Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Russia, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan (it has not yet entered into force). 
37 For example, the Preamble to the EC-Hungary EA. 
38 Article 1 EU-Ukraine PCA. 
39 For the comparative overview and scrutiny of the PCAs see R. PETROV, The 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Newly Independent States in: A. 
OTT / K. INGLIS (eds.), European Enlargement Handbook (Asser Press, The Hague 
2002) pp. 175-194. 
40 These are: customs law, company law, banking law, company accounts and 
taxes, intellectual property, protection of workers at the workplace, financial 
services, rules on competition, public procurement, protection of life and health of 
humans, animal and plants, the environment, consumer protection, indirect 
taxation, technical rules and standards, nuclear laws and regulations and transport. 
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It openly promulgated the eventual objective of EU-Ukraine cooperation - 
full EU membership. One may suspect that the Ukrainian government 
seriously considered the possibility of replicating the example of the EA 
countries which had managed to acquire candidate country status in very 
short time after signing the EAs. In other words, the Ukrainian 
government made an attempt to “catch the train” of accelerating European 
integration by fulfilling formal commitments in the PCA. 
With the purpose of “knocking” on the “European door”, the Ukrainian 
government soundly proclaimed its European aspirations. The general 
framework of the integration process was set up in the Strategy of 
Integration of Ukraine into the EU (Strategy of Integration)41. The purpose 
of this document is to declare Ukrainian ambitions to join the EU as soon 
as possible. Besides, this document determines the major priorities of the 
executive power to fulfil the objective of ultimate EU membership42. 
Intrinsically, the President of Ukraine stated that ‘joining the European 
political, economic and legal area and, subsequently, acquiring associate 
membership of the EU constitute the major priority of the Ukrainian 
foreign policy in the medium term’43. Soon after, the scope of competence 
of the executive agencies was defined, and the corresponding institutional 
framework was established with the purpose of accelerating the process of 
integration and of implementing the PCA44. 
The approximation of the Ukrainian legislation to EU law was formally 
launched in 1999 when the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued the 
Concept of Adaptation of Ukrainian laws to the legislation of the EU 
(Concept of Adaptation), in which the official understanding of the 
adaptation process was set up45. The Concept of Adaptation formulates the 
                                                          
41 Edict (Ukaz) of the President of Ukraine “On approval of the ‘Strategy of 
integration of Ukraine to the European Union’”, 11 June 1998, № 615/98. 
42 The initial deadline to qualify for full membership in 2007 was recently 
extended to 2011. The deadline to acquire WTO membership was set at 2003 
(Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “European 
Choice. Conceptual foundations of the strategy of economic and social 
development of Ukraine in 2002-2011”, 20 June 2002, № 20-IV). 
43 Supra note 41, para 7 of the preamble. 
44 Ruling (Rasporiadzhenia) of the President of Ukraine “About the list of the 
governmental authorities responsible for fulfilment of the tasks defined by the 
“Strategy on Integration of Ukraine to the European Union”, 27 June 1999, № 
151/99-rp (as amended by Edict of the President of Ukraine, 06 July 2000, № 
240/2000). 
45 To date, about 50 legal acts concerning the integration of Ukraine into the EU 
have been adopted by the Verkhovna Rada and the Government of Ukraine. 
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notion “adaptation” as a gradual and coherent process, which encompasses 
three basic stages, each of them guaranteeing a certain level of conformity 
of laws in the specified priority spheres46. 
The first stage of adaptation is targeted at developing the Ukrainian legal 
system in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, approximating 
Ukrainian laws in the priority areas envisaged in the PCA and other 
international treaties relating to EU-Ukraine cooperation and within the 
priority fields in the Concept of Adaptation47. 
The second stage of adaptation comprises the reconsideration of 
Ukrainian legislation in force in the spheres, specified in Article 51 of the 
PCA with the purpose of approximate adequacy [emphasis added] with 
EU legislation. Furthermore, this stage anticipates the provision of legal 
assistance on the establishment of a free trade area between Ukraine and 
the EU, as well as the consequent preparation of Ukraine for an 
association agreement with the EU. It is envisaged that this stage of 
adaptation is likely to commence in time for the transition membership 
period of the first wave accession of the Central and Eastern European 
countries into the EU. Of course, this timetable has not been met by the 
Ukrainian side. 
The third stage of adaptation is the least well-defined. It could be 
launched upon the EU’s acknowledgment of sufficient progress by 
Ukraine in pursuing tasks set for the first and second stages of adaptation. 
The final stage of adaptation is aimed at preparing Ukraine for the 
negotiation of an accession agreement with the EU, and the subsequent 
harmonisation of the entire Ukrainian legislation with the whole 
“Community acquis”. 
Undoubtedly, the EU noticed the integration efforts in Ukraine and 
decided to encourage its further progress, while underlining that the 
perspective of the EU membership for Ukraine is still remote. For this 
purpose, the EU sent the very first positive signal to the Ukrainian 
government by issuing the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine (CS). This 
document (adopted by the European Council on 11
th
 December 1999 in 
Helsinki) complements the PCA, thereby marking the emerging skeleton 
                                                          
46 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concept of adaptation of the 
legislation of Ukraine to the legislation of the EU”, 16 August 1999, № 1496. 
Recently, legal acts issued by the Government of Ukraine seem to apply 
simultaneously and, sometimes interchangeably, the definitions “adaptation”, 
“approximation”, “harmonisation”, without clarifying the difference of their 
content. 
47 Ibid, Article 2 para 4. 
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of laws governing the relations between Ukraine and the EU, wherein the 
PCA occupies the upper level48. The CS displays clear political and 
economic guidelines to Ukraine for the purpose of enhancing the nature of 
its relations with the EU. In response to Ukraine’s reiterated diplomatic 
calls for a new framework agreement, the CS merely acknowledges and 
welcomes Ukraine’s European aspirations, and states its major objective of 
working with Ukraine to facilitate further rapprochement with the EU49. 
The CS towards Ukraine prioritises the support for the democratic and 
economic transition in Ukraine, including the progressive approximation 
of its national legislation50, and foresees the possibility of studying the 
circumstances of the establishment of a free trade area between Ukraine 
and the EC51. The CS on Ukraine has further endorsed the importance of 
the approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU, and complemented 
the list of priority areas52. On the one hand, the CS towards Ukraine 
supported Ukraine’s European aspirations, and encouraged Ukraine to 
pursue the voluntary harmonisation of its legislation to that of the EU. On 
the other hand, it confirmed its unwillingness to revise and enhance the 
modest objectives of the EU-Ukraine cooperation outlined in the PCA. 
In general, very little progress was made during the second stage of 
harmonisation/adaptation programme in Ukraine. Neither of the stages 
envisaged in the Concept of Adaptation has been achieved. The Ukrainian 
government failed to move further than enunciating “pro-European 
slogans”. It has become apparent that the success of the 
harmonisation/adaptation programme is intrinsically linked to an 
                                                          
48 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council (O.J. 1999, L 331/1, at 
56). 
The same is envisaged in the CS towards Russia. The European Council meeting 
in Cologne in June 1999 adopted the first CS towards Russia. Presidency 
Conclusions, Cologne European Council (O.J. 1999, L 157/1, at 78). 
49 Article 6 of the CS towards Ukraine. 
50 It is stressed in Article 20 of the CS towards Ukraine that approximation 
should take place in such areas as: competition policy, standards and certification, 
intellectual property rights, data protection, customs procedures and environment. 
51 Article 61 of the CS towards Ukraine. 
52 These are issues of fiscal policy, personal data protection and money 
laundering. Decisions of the Helsinki Summit with regard to the approximation 
were implemented into Ukrainian legislation by the decision of the 4th 
Interministerial Coordination Council on that adaptation of the Ukrainian 
legislation to EU legislation by Decree (Postanova) of the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine “Regulation on Interministerial Coordination Council on the adaptation of 
Ukrainian legislation to EU legislation”, 12 June 1998, № 852. 
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efficiently-functioning institutional framework and comprehensive 
educational measures in the area of EU law. Unfortunately, the Concept of 
Adaptation did not ensure the achievement of these aims. Very little has 
been done to spread knowledge about foundations of EU law among 
Ukrainian civil servants and governmental officials. A limited number of 
courses in EU law was set up in Ukrainian universities. European technical 
assistance has not been always effectively used. As a result, the Ukrainian 
government failed to accumulate the considerable expertise in EU law 
necessary to pursue voluntary harmonisation on a more efficient level. In 
our opinion, this situation resulted from the lack of a general consensus 
within the EU on the scope and limits of the harmonisation/adaptation 
programme in Ukraine. A significant advance of the Ukrainian 
harmonisation/adaptation programme could encourage the EU to enhance 
the format of EU-Ukraine relations. We suspect that at that stage, the EU 
was not interested in the enhancement of bilateral relations with Ukraine, 
owing to its preoccupation with serious external (the approaching 
absorption of the Central and Eastern European countries into the EU), and 
internal (launch of EURO) challenges. 
The third stage of EU-Ukraine relations lasted from 11
th
 December 1999 
(issuing of the CS on Ukraine) until 2004 (launch of the ENP). The 
impressive progress of the Central and Eastern European countries 
towards full EU membership encouraged the President of Ukraine Leonid 
Kuchma to reiterate calls for eventual EU membership. One of his first 
steps was the issuing in 2000 of the comprehensive Programme of 
Integration to the EU (Programme of Integration)53, which displayed a 
framework of short-term, medium-term and long-term objectives for the 
executive branch of power to integrate Ukraine into the EU. This is a legal 
document of a higher value than the Concept of Adaptation, since it was 
issued by the President of Ukraine. It therefore has priority over legal acts 
issued by the executive and municipalities. The Programme of Integration 
complements the Concept of Adaptation by establishing institutional and 
administrative mechanisms for the harmonisation/approximation process. 
In particular, the Programme of Integration binds the Cabinet of Ministers 
to ensure funding from the State Budget for the 
harmonisation/approximation process. Furthermore, the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine is requested to issue yearly Adaptation Action 
                                                          
53 Programme of integration to the European Union, approved by the Edict of 
the President of Ukraine, 14th September 2000 № 1072/2000. 
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Plans54, which set up a precise list of organisational and legislative 
measures to be enforced and adopted in the course of the calendar year. 
The PCA common institutions (Cooperation Council and Cooperation 
Committee) are empowered to monitor the implementation of yearly 
Adaptation Action Plans. The scope of these plans is not exclusive to the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire into the Ukrainian legal order. In 
fact, yearly Adaptation Action Plans could envisage the adoption of 
international rules which help to reach the general objectives of the EU-
Ukraine partnership. For instance, the 2002 Yearly Action Plan pays 
particular attention to cooperation with international institutions and the 
enforcement of international conventions (accession into the WTO is 
regarded as one of major priorities for the time being). In response to the 
Cabinet of Ministers Action Plan, all ministries and government agencies 
involved in the process of Ukraine’s integration into the EU were 
requested to issue their own yearly Adaptation Action Plans55. 
Furthermore, Ukraine passed considerable institutional reforms 
following the launch of the Programme of Integration in 2000. Hitherto, 
the President of Ukraine has remained the main political figure enforcing 
European integration policy in the country. He guides and defines the 
strategy of integration, sets up the external policy priorities, and as part of 
his jurisdiction authorises agencies, organisations, institutions and civil 
servants to execute duties concerning integration. Advisory bodies were 
established to assist the President of Ukraine in framing the integration 
strategy into the EU and other international institutions. 
The Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine ensures the implementation of the 
Programme of Integration in practice. The major workload is divided 
between the Ministries, each of them responsible for a certain sphere, 
designated by the Cabinet of Ministers56. The Coordination Council for the 
adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to EU laws57 exercises general 
                                                          
54 Action Plan for the fulfilment of priority provisions of the Programme of 
integration in 2002 adopted by the Ruling the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 
28th January 2002, № 34-p. 
55 For example see the Action Plan 2002 of the Ministry of European Integration 
and Economy on 1st April 2002, № 90. 
56 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers “On the approval of the Temporary Rules 
of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers”, 5 June 2000, № 915 amended by Decree 
of the Cabinet of Ministers, 10th January 2002, № 39. 
57 Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On some issues of 
adaptation of the Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU”, 15th October 2004 № 
1365/2004. 
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coordination of the approximation of laws process within the executive 
branch of power and issues binding decisions. All legal acts to be issued 
by the Cabinet of Ministers must be taken through the monitoring and 
compliance procedure. Any draft that falls within the priority areas of 
adaptation must be screened by the Ministry of Justice for conformity with 
EU legislation58. In case of a submitted draft’s inconsistency with EU 
legislation, the Ministry of Justice issues its conclusion that could contain 
the reasons for non-compliance. Nevertheless, it is up to the Cabinet of 
Ministers to have the final word in deciding whether it is necessary to pass 
the particular law, taking into account either the affirmative or negative 
conclusion of the Ministry of Justice. Such a juncture shows the wide 
scope of the discretion of the Cabinet of Ministers in shaping the speed 
and depth of the adaptation process in Ukraine. However, it could be 
argued that the work of the Cabinet of Ministers in the 
harmonisation/adaptation of Ukrainian legislation has not been sufficiently 
monitored by the judiciary and legislature or the general public. The 
Cabinet of Ministers is accountable to the President of Ukraine and the 
Verkhovna Rada. Nevertheless, the Cabinet of Ministers was not publicly 
criticised by the delay in the harmonisation/adaptation. Owing to the lack 
of transparency within the Cabinet of Ministers, the accountability of its 
work to the general public in Ukraine was also hampered. Yearly 
Adaptation Plans have not been adequately discussed in the media, and 
academics and students had very little chance to obtain prompt 
information about new initiatives within the harmonisation/adaptation 
process. 
Until 2002, the adaptation process was exercised solely within the 
executive branch of power under the guidance of the President of Ukraine. 
Therefore, there was neither a comprehensive legal nor a coherent 
institutional mechanism for coordinating the adaptation process by all 
branches of power, including the legislature and the judiciary. As a result, 
many of the Ukrainian laws adopted by the executive were inconsistent 
with primary laws issued by the Verkhovna Rada. From 1999 to 2004, 
some attempts were made to bring all branches of power into the coherent 
institutional framework of the adaptation process59. The major 
                                                          
58 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers “On the establishment of the State 
Department in issues of adaptation of legislation”, 24th December 2004, № 1742. 
59 The Strategy on integration empowered the highest, central and local 
executive authorities of Ukraine to establish close cooperation with the legislative - 
the Verkhovna Rada - and the relevant local council authorities to pursue 
integration into the EU at all levels of the Ukrainian society. 
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breakthrough came after the parliamentary elections in 2002, when 
Ukraine’s European aspirations were given a majority endorsement by the 
victorious political parties. The Verkhovna Rada has explicitly 
acknowledged the need to adopt laws aimed at the implementation of the 
PCA, the accession of Ukraine into the WTO, and the establishment of a 
free trade area with the EC. As a result, the Parliamentary Committee for 
issues of European Integration was established. The Verkhovna Rada 
Rules of Procedure were amended so as to avoid the adoption of laws 
which contradict EU legal standards60, and a framework law “On the All 
State Programme on the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to EU laws” 
(Programme on adaptation) was issued in 200461. In our opinion, the issue 
of the Programme on adaptation was a desperate attempt to accelerate the 
integration of Ukraine into the EU. This law envisages the export of the 
whole “accession acquis” into the legal system of Ukraine, since the 
objective of this law is the ‘alignment of the Ukrainian legislation with the 
acquis communautaire taking into consideration criteria specified by the 
EU towards countries willing to join the EU’. In other words, Ukraine 
readily agreed to implement the “accession acquis” on a voluntary basis, 
without any perspective of full EU membership. It should be noted that the 
EU never indicated that voluntary harmonisation would lead to the 
immediate recognition of Ukrainian perspectives to join the EU. 
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government decided that the 
harmonisation/adaptation programme would be the most expedient way to 
step into one of waves of the European enlargement in the region of 
Eastern Europe. Despite such ambitious “approximation offers” on behalf 
of Ukraine, EU-Ukraine mutual relations have reached a deadlock. Until 
now the EU has remained reluctant to acknowledge any perspective of 
either full EU membership, or association between the EU and Ukraine. 
In order to rectify such a perplexing situation, the Commission initiated 
the “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood” policy towards third countries 
sharing an immediate post-enlargement border with the EU62. The 
                                                          
60 Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “Recommendations after 
parliamentary hearings in issues of realisation of the governmental policy on 
integration of Ukraine to the EU”, 17th January 2002, № 2999-III. 
61 Law of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “About the All State Programme of 
adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU”, 18th March 2004, № 1629-
IV. 
62 Сommunication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”. (COM (2003) 104 final). 
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Commission acknowledged Ukraine as its “privileged partner” along with 
Russia, Belarus, and Moldova. In the case of Ukraine, the eventual 
objectives of the ENP are: 1) the establishment of a free trade area 
between the EC and Ukraine; 2) access to selected segments of the EC 
internal market and the EC “financial packages”. In return, it encourages 
Ukraine to continue the voluntary adoption of the acquis communautaire, 
without participating in the EU decision-making and legislative 
procedures. 
The adoption of the bilateral Action Plan in February 2005 by the 
Commission and the Ukrainian government marks the beginning of the 
fourth stage in the EU-Ukrainian relations. Action Plans identify the 
format of bilateral relations between the EU and neighbouring countries 
for the next three-year term. Therefore, Action Plans are not identical. On 
the contrary, they are tailored to satisfy the individual needs of the 
neighbouring countries in the course of rapprochement with the EU. At the 
same time, Action Plans contain some common elements which respond to 
the overall objectives of the ENP. They are: adherence to common 
democratic values, the establishment of a functioning market economy, 
and the approximation of neighbouring countries’ laws to that of the EU. 
The ENP encourages neighbouring states to embark upon the voluntary 
adoption of the acquis communautaire, without participating in the EU 
decision-making and legislative procedures. Bilateral Action Plans have 
been agreed to clarify the precise scope of the acquis communautaire to be 
adopted by a neighbouring state. Hitherto, the bilateral Action Plans have 
been concluded with Ukraine, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Moldova, the 
Palestinian Authority, and Tunis. 
In our opinion, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan does not move further than 
the EU-Ukraine CS in terms of clarifying the possibility of Ukrainian 
accession to the EU. It merely ‘acknowledges Ukraine’s European 
aspirations and welcomes Ukraine’s European choice’. Furthermore, it 
recognises the PCA as a ‘valid basis for EU-Ukraine cooperation’. 
However, the Action Plan envisages the further economic integration of 
the Parties ‘through joint efforts’ towards an EU-Ukraine free trade area, 
following Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. Furthermore, ‘consideration 
will be given to the possibility of a new enhanced agreement, whose scope 
will be defined in the light of the fulfilment of the objectives of this Action 
Plan and of the overall evolution of EU-Ukraine relations’. 
One of the major objectives of the Action Plan is to outline the priority 
areas for the internal reforms to be implemented by Ukraine. The emphasis 
on voluntary harmonisation is the strongest among all the Action Plans. 
For example, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan encourages Ukraine to enhance 
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its legislative and institutional foundations, in order to absorb not all, but a 
wide range of the acquis communautaire. The priority areas of 
approximation exceed what is envisaged in the PCA and the CS. It covers 
the following legal reforms to be undertaken by the Ukrainian government 
within the three-year term: the adoption and enforcement of EU common 
values (democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms); 
adherence to fundamental democratic principles (respect for free media, 
respect of rights of national minorities, protections of rights of children); 
the signing and enforcement of international conventions (Charter of the 
International Criminal Court, United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions); participation in international democratic and security 
initiatives (non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating 
terrorism); cooperation in EU foreign and security policy. We forecast that 
one of the first steps of legal reform in Ukraine could be the revision of the 
Constitution of Ukraine, in order to establish the supremacy of 
international law within the Ukrainian legal order63. In our opinion, the 
priority for the institutional reform must be the establishment of a Ministry 
of European Integration that would be capable of coordinating the 
approximation process within the executive, legislative and judiciary. 
The EU-Ukraine Action Plan must be perceived as something different 
or parallel to the PCA. The EU-Ukraine Action Plan serves as a practical 
tool to reach the objectives of the ENP. One may argue that the EU-
Ukraine Action Plan brings Ukraine closer to the EU through other various 
non-contractual means than formal cooperation within the PCA. As stated 
above, this conclusion is based on three factors. Firstly, the launch of the 
EU-Ukraine Action Plan stipulated the de facto enhancement of the 
political, economic and legal commitments envisaged in the PCA by the 
Ukrainian political elite and general public. Of course, these commitments 
are of a non-binding nature and, therefore, cannot override commitments 
within the PCA. Nevertheless, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan contributed to 
the re-orientation of the Ukrainian political elite towards Europe, and 
accelerated the voluntary harmonisation of Ukrainian legislation to that of 
the EU. Secondly, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan persuades Ukraine to 
                                                          
63 Article 9 of the Ukrainian Constitution provides that ‘international treaties that 
are in force, agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, are part of 
the national legislation of Ukraine. The conclusion of international treaties that 
contravene the Constitution of Ukraine is possible only after introducing relevant 
amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine.’ Thus in case of conflict between the 
Constitution of Ukraine and the PCA, a  provision of the Constitution of Ukraine 
either prevails or must be amended.  
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reconsider the application of international law sources within its national 
legal system, in order to enable the implementation of European common 
values and principles. Thirdly, the EU will closely monitor the success of 
the Action Plan implementation through means already developed and 
tested within the “pre-accession” of the Central and Eastern European 
countries. In our opinion, the ENP offers better means (action plans, 
country reports) to ensure the effective implementation of the acquis 
communautaire by Ukraine than under the PCA. One may predict that 
special attention will be paid by the EU to the effectiveness of the 
harmonisation/approximation process in Ukraine in the course of 
implementing the Action Plan. Therefore, Action Plans represent a 
successful model for how initiatives taken outside the PCAs may affect the 
approximation process, without imposing binding commitments on a third 
country. 
 
5.3. To conclude, in the case study we set out a number of 
considerations which lead us to believe that the objectives of the PCA and 
the status of relations between the EU and Ukraine are intrinsic factors 
which determine the scope and means of the acquis communautaire to be 
exported into the Ukrainian legal system. The first consideration is that 
one-sided attempts by Ukraine to secure the possibility of joining the EU 
through the promulgation of the voluntary harmonisation of legislation has 
not brought about any positive result, irrespective of the actual progress 
made by the Ukrainian government. It must be admitted that the Ukrainian 
government has achieved quite modest results in the course of 
approximating national legislation to that of the EU. Most national legal 
acts in approximating laws have had a declarative character. The 
Ukrainian government has continued to maintain trade barriers in order to 
protect national producers. Anticompetitive behaviour and state aid to 
national enterprises have been sustained. However, the basic institutional 
framework has been established. All branches of power have started to 
cooperate to ensure the success of the voluntary harmonisation 
programme. The example of Ukraine shows that EU institutions could be 
interested in supporting and acknowledging the process of voluntary 
harmonisation within a third country through technical assistance and 
additional initiatives, such as the ENP. However, the EU has hardly 
changed the format of bilateral relations without serious political or 
economic justifications. That is why Ukrainian efforts to launch the 
“accession acquis” in 1999 and in 2004 did not have an effect on the 
general state of EU-Ukraine relations. In both cases, the EU welcomed 
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Ukrainian approximation efforts, but did not push through Ukrainian 
chances to join the EU. 
The second consideration is that the scope of the acquis communautaire 
to be implemented by Ukraine mirrors the changes in bilateral relations 
between the EU and Ukraine. The first significant change took place in 
1999, when the CS towards Ukraine was adopted at the Helsinki Summit. 
This document endorsed the approximation as one of the major objectives 
of EU-Ukraine cooperation, and added new priority areas of the 
approximation process in Ukraine to what has been already specified in 
the PCA. The second significant change took place in 2005 after the 
adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. This document considerably 
revises the scope of the acquis communautaire to be adopted by Ukraine. 
In addition to the priority areas of approximation in the PCA, the Action 
Plan puts forward common values, and EU principles, as well as various 
political and economic criteria to be effectively implemented by the 
Ukrainian government. Furthermore, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan lists in 
detail actions and elements of the acquis communautaire which must be 
implemented by Ukraine. To ensure that the Ukrainian government takes 
these commitments seriously, the EU applied strong conditionality on 
Ukraine promising to sign a new enhanced agreement upon the successful 
fulfilment of the Action Plan within a three-year term. The new 
“enhanced” or “neighbourhood agreement” will substitute the existing EU-
Ukraine PCA, which expires in 2008. The Commission will launch 
negotiations with Ukraine on this agreement in 2007. It is difficult to 
predict the exact scope of the agreement since this type of contractual 
relationship will be a complete novelty in EU external relations. However, 
following general objectives of the ENP the new “enhanced” or 
“neighbourhood agreement” will certainly does not offer a perspective of 
the full EU membership for Ukraine but could offer a stake in the EC 
internal market for Ukrainian nationals. To be able to get this offer 
Ukraine most likely will be expected to adopt and effectively implement 
European common democratic values and extended scope of the acquis 
communautaire. It is quite possible that the acquis communautaire within 
the new “enhanced” or “neighbourhood agreement” between the EU and 
Ukraine will exceed the acquis communautaire provided in the earlier EU-
Ukraine documents (PCA, CS, Action Plan) and will be supplemented by 
stringent monitoring procedure on behalf of the EU. In this case, the 
acquis communautaire will be used as an important tool in hands of EU 
institutions, which will be in position to interpret unilaterally the scope of 
applicable acquis, to speed up, and, therefore, to influence democratic and 
market reforms in Ukraine in the foreseeable future.  
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Carried to its logical conclusion, we state that the EU is active in 
pursuing the policy of “exporting” the acquis communautaire into the legal 
orders of third countries. That is to say that the enhancement of political 
and economic relations between the EU and a third country (offering a 
candidate state status, establishing a customs union, providing access to 
EC internal market freedoms) could encourage the party to an agreement 
to embark upon the voluntary harmonisation of its legislation to that of the 
EU. Therefore, we insist on considering the acquis communautaire within 
EC/EU external agreements as a dynamic category, which directly 
depends not only on the explicit objectives of these agreements, but also 
on the wider framework of relations between the parties and the general 
political climate of bilateral relations. 
Subsequently, we argue that the acquis communautaire should be 
regarded as a sophisticated tool of EU external policy. Recognising the 
established role of the EU as a “rule generator”, we acknowledge that the 
vague concept of the “acquis communautaire” serves as an appropriate 
“wrapping” for the export of EU-generated rules abroad. Similar to a 
missionary, the acquis communautaire gradually establishes a friendly 
legal environment beyond EU borders through the export of its values, 
principles, and legal heritage abroad. In many cases, the EU does not 
worry about the non-binding nature of the approximation commitments. 
Reluctance and caution of third countries to adopt the acquis 
communautaire could be appeased by carefully-orchestrated EU external 
policy and the use of conditionality, which does not depend on the 
existence of binding harmonisation/approximation commitments. 
These thoughts carry us to the conclusion that the omission of a precise 
definition of the concept of “acquis communautaire” in the EU 
Constitutional Treaty is not fortuitous, but intentional. In other words, 
despite being a guardian of constitutional values, the EU Constitutional 
Treaty does not anchor the acquis communautaire to a shore of fixed and 
coherent legal definitions. Instead, the EU Constitutional Treaty paves the 
way for the continuation of the open-ended application of this category by 
the EU institutions, despite its being designed to simplify the EU legal 
order. We believe that this juncture explicitly supports our position that the 
past, recent, and future application of the acquis communautaire within the 
realm of EU external action is subordinated to tailor-made objectives and 
de facto relations with third countries. This view perfectly echoes the 
aphorism by the XIX century Russian satirist Kozma Putkov: “First buy a 
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painting, and then look for a frame”. Indeed, the acquis communautaire 
serves as a frame to support and to “embellish” EU external policy towards 
a third country. In return, one must be able to view the entire intricate 
picture of the EU relations with third countries, in order to evaluate the 
suitability and to recognise the scope of the acquis communautaire within 
a particular EC/EU external agreement. 
Another ancillary idea of this article was to give the reader a rather more 
comprehensive view of the way in which the logic behind the acquis 
communautaire operates. Our methods and research findings are not 
exclusive to the acquis communautaire. We believe that the same 
approaches may be applied to other dynamic notions, such as “values of 
the Union” and “EU general principles”. The contemporary scholar would 
find it difficult to operate with the “acquis communautaire” without 
possessing a comprehensive knowledge of all the potential dimensions of 
this notion. Thus, it is hoped that, in many respects, this study can be used 
as a self-contained guide for determining the likely scope of the acquis 
communautaire in the course of the negotiations of future EU external 
agreements by third countries. 
Furthermore, our study has highlighted other problems which warrant 
investigation in the near future. The first problem is that third countries 
may experience difficulties in accepting legal norms developed elsewhere. 
Phrases from EU legal acts may be incorporated into the legal systems of 
third countries. However, ideas and objectives of these norms cannot be 
replicated without exporting entire regulatory and institutional 
mechanisms accumulated within the EU throughout the history of 
European integration. The second problem relates to the impact of political 
agenda in relations between the EU and third countries in the process of 
harmonisation/approximation of laws. A case study on the Ukrainian 
experience of adapting national law to that of the EU illustrates that 
political realities of the EU-Ukraine relations have always determined 
Ukraine’s stance towards harmonisation/approximation commitments. The 
third problem involves the implications of the acquis as an international 
law obligation for a third country. The export of the acquis 
communautaire implies a drastic change of third countries’ constitutional 
foundations. In most cases, third countries must revise their constitutions 
in order to enable the legal effect of the acquis, and in particular, of EU 
general principles and common values. However, the modest level of 
cooperation provided in most EU external agreements and non-binding 
harmonisation/approximation commitments provide very little incentive 
for comprehensive constitutional reforms in third countries. We have 
endeavoured to express our view on these issues. However, they require 
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deeper study and a more comprehensive research analysis. Therefore, we 
hope that our work will complement prolonged discussion on the external 
dimension of the acquis communautaire, and will provide lavish food for 
further explorations of this subject. 
ABSTRACTS/RÉSUMÉS 
The aim of this article is a legal study of the dynamic nature of the concept of the 
acquis communautaire in the domain of EU external relations. It is argued that the 
acquis communautaire varies in line with objectives of internal and external 
dimensions of its application. The major objective of the acquis communautaire in 
its internal dimension is to enable the consistent development of the EU while 
preserving EC/EU patrimony by Member States. The objective of the acquis 
communautaire application in its external dimension is to export the acquis 
communautaire overseas in order to push third countries at the forefront of the 
acquired level of economic, political and legal cooperation achieved by the EU. It 
is argued that the acquis communautaire in its external dimension is not coherent, 
but mirrors the specific objectives of relations between the EU and third countries. 
Results obtained through comprehensive analysis of EU external agreements and 
the case study indicates that the acquis communautaire is a complex legal category 
of a dynamic nature. One must take into consideration the general objectives of EU 
external agreements, and the status of bilateral relations between the EU and third 
countries, in order to comprehend the fullest scope of the applicable acquis 
communautaire. 
 
Le but de cet article est de présenter une étude juridique de la nature dynamique du 
concept de l’acquis communautaire dans le domaine des relations extérieures de 
l’Union européenne. Il est avancé que l’acquis communautaire varie en fonction 
d’objectifs de dimensions internes et externes de son application. L’objectif majeur 
de l’acquis communautaire dans sa dimension interne est de permettre le 
développement cohérent de l’Union européenne tout en préservant le patrimoine 
CE/UE des États membres. L’objectif de la mise en oeuvre de l’acquis 
communautaire dans sa dimension externe est d’exporter l’acquis communautaire 
afin d’amener les pays tiers au niveau acquis de cooopération économique, 
politique et juridique atteint par l’Union européenne. Il est avancé que l’acquis 
communautaire dans sa dimension externe n’est pas cohérent mais reflète les 
objectifs spécifiques des relations entre l’Union européenne et les pays tiers. Les 
résultats obtenus à travers une analyse complète des accords extérieurs de l’Union 
européenne et l’étude de cas montrent que l’acquis communautaire est une 
catégorie juridique complexe de nature dynamique. Il convient de prendre en 
considération les objectifs généraux des accords extérieurs de l’Union européenne 
et le statut des relations bilatérales entre l’Union européenne et les pays tiers pour 
comprendre toute l’étendue de l’acquis communautaire applicable.    
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